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Abstract
Background: Dengue has not reached an endemic status in Taiwan; nevertheless, we have implemented a fever
screening program at airports for the early detection of febrile passengers with a dengue infection. This study is
intended to assess the performance of the airport screening procedures for dengue infection.
Methods: We analyzed data from the national surveillance system of the Taiwan Centers for Disease Control. We
included the imported dengue cases reported by sentinel airports and clinics as well as the domestic cases from
2007–2010.
Results: Approximately 44.9% (95%CI: 35.73-54.13%) of the confirmed imported dengue cases with an apparent
symptom (febrile) in the viremic stage were detected via the airport fever screening program, with an estimated
positive predictive value of 2.36% (95% CI: 0.96- 3.75%) and a negative predictive value > 99.99%. Fluctuations in the
number of the symptomatic imported dengue cases identified in the airports (X) were associated with the total
number of imported dengue cases (Y) based on a regression analysis of a biweekly surveillance (i.e., n = 104, R2X:
Y = 0.61, P< 0.005). Additionally, the fluctuating patterns in the cumulative numbers of the imported dengue cases
(X) with a 1–2 month lead time (t) was in parallel with that of the domestic dengue cases (Y) based on a
consecutive 4-year surveillance (i.e., n = 48, R2 X(t-1):Y = 0.22, R
2
X(t-2):Y = 0.31, P< 0.001) from 2007–2010.
Conclusions: A moderate sensitivity of detecting dengue at the airports examined in this study indicated some
limitations of the fever screening program for the prevention of importation. The screening program could assist in
the rapid triage for self-quarantine of some symptomatic dengue cases that were in the viremic stage at the
borders and contribute to active sentinel surveillance; however, the blocking of viral transmission to susceptible
populations (neighbors or family) from all of the viremic travelers, including those with or without symptoms, is
critical to prevent dengue epidemics. Therefore, the reinforcement of mosquito bite prevention and household
vector control in dengue-endemic or dengue-competent hotspots during an epidemic season is essential and
highly recommended.
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Background
Dengue viruses are some of the most significant arbovirus
pathogens worldwide and cause endemic infections in
tropical and subtropical regions. Approximately one-third
of the global human population is at risk of infection
[1-4]. The human incidence of dengue infection has
increased dramatically over the past 50 years [1-3] due to
the lack of an effective vaccine, exponential increases in
international travel and shifts in global ecology. Addition-
ally, the Aedes aegypti species, which is a major dengue
vector, has spread considerably. Moreover, the population
growth and urbanization of tropical and subtropical
regions have increased the breeding sites for the mosqui-
toes that transmit the dengue virus [1-3]. The clinical
features of dengue infection range from a mild, febrile
illness (dengue fever) to fatal conditions, such as dengue
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hemorrhagic fever and dengue shock syndrome. The four
related dengue virus serotypes have worldwide distribu-
tions, and the genotypes that are associated with increased
virulence have expanded from South and Southeast Asia
into the Pacific regions and the Americas [1,5,6].
Dengue is non-endemic in Taiwan, and the clusters of
domestic cases have been the result of viremic travelers
arriving from dengue-endemic countries [7,8]. The dis-
tinct ecologies of southern and northern Taiwan contrib-
ute to the different epidemiological patterns observed in
these regions. Southern Taiwan is conducive to dengue
outbreaks because of its tropical climate and the pres-
ence of A. aegypti, which is a major dengue vector that
is accustomed to being indoors. In contrast, northern
Taiwan is less threatened by the dengue virus because it
has a subtropical climate and is home to Aedes albopictus,
which is a minor dengue vector that is accustomed to
being outdoors [8,9]. Furthermore, three consecutive days
with temperatures below 18°C results in the abolishment
of the viral transmission chain mediated by the Aedes
mosquitoes. This climatic bottleneck effect suppresses
dengue proliferation each year and significantly curbs out-
breaks in southern Taiwan [8-10]. This cold climatic effect
is responsible for the non-endemic status of dengue in
Taiwan; however, heavy international travel in Taiwan
might promote the importation of the dengue virus and
viral transmission within the community.
Before 2003, the self-completion of a health card and
the visual inspection of passengers were implemented at
the borders of most countries to screen for infections in-
cluding dengue. The emergence of Severe Acute Re-
spiratory Syndrome (SARS) in 2003 highlighted the role
of international travel in the rapid spread of infectious
diseases and prompted many countries, including Taiwan,
to establish border control strategies and introduce non-
contact infrared thermometers (NCITs) at international
airports to reduce the risk of imported infections [11,12].
However, several studies have indicated that the border
control measures do not significantly contribute to the
prevention of a local epidemic [12-15]. NCITs or alterna-
tive measures of border screening were found to be effect-
ive in the early detection and isolation of index cases, thus
providing a short-term (7–12 day) delay in the local trans-
mission of novel influenzas [16].
Taiwan is one of the countries that has implemented
entry screening with NCITs since 2003 [11,12]. Subse-
quently, we expanded this noninvasive diagnostic tool to
screen for various infections, including dengue, at entry
borders. Using the NCITs for dengue fever screening at
airports has allowed us to retrospectively analyze the
datasets of detected dengue cases. In this study, we aim
to assess the performance of the airport fever screening
program in regard to dengue triage for self-quarantine
and its potential role for active sentinel surveillance.
Methods
Case definitions and database analysis
Dengue is classified as a reportable infectious disease
and suspected cases must be reported within 24 hours
for a clinical diagnosis in Taiwan. The analyses in this
study used data of the confirmed dengue cases obtained
from the National Notifiable Disease Surveillance Sys-
tem of the Taiwan Centers for Disease Control (Taiwan
CDC). The definition of a confirmed dengue case
includes the positive detection of RNA, antigen or anti-
body by laboratory diagnoses. A domestic dengue case
was a confirmed case in which the patient had not trav-
eled in the two weeks prior to the onset of illness. An
imported dengue case was a confirmed case in which
the patient had traveled to dengue-endemic countries in
the two weeks prior to the onset of illness. The total
imported dengue cases included those inbound passen-
gers that were diagnosed as dengue-positive by airport
screening and those that were diagnosed by clinics or
hospitals following entry into the community.
Surveillance of dengue by active and passive procedures
For the comprehensive and effective surveillance of den-
gue infection, both active surveillance and passive sur-
veillance were performed. The active surveillance
includes fever screening at the airport, health statements
from the inbound passengers, screening for contact with
confirmed cases and school-based reporting. The passive
surveillance refers to the hospital-based reporting system
for the notification of either imported or domestic den-
gue cases. All relevant data and diagnostic results were
reported via the web-based National Surveillance System
for subsequent tracking and management.
The airport fever screening program was introduced
in 2003 to detect viremic travelers who were infected
with SARS, dengue or other infections [11]. In this
study, we analyzed data that were collected from the
International Taoyuan Airport and the International
Kaohsiung Airport, which consisted of 4 or 1 entry
gates in Taiwan during 2007–2010, respectively. Two
thermal NCITs were set up at each entry gate, and each
NCIT had an infrared-thermal camera (remote sensor
device, Flir A40 or Flir P20). Travelers with an NCIT-
detected temperature of higher than 37.5°C were
detained at the entry gate, rechecked by quarantine offi-
cers with a symptoms survey and reassessed using an
ear thermometer. Travelers with a temperature above
38°C were defined as confirmed fever cases. Subse-
quently, travelers who had arrived from dengue-affected
areas were triaged for additional diagnostics by quaran-
tine officers and their specimens were taken for testing
with the Dengue NS1 Rapid Test Kit (Bio-Rad, USA) at
the airport inspection stations. Simultaneously, dupli-
cate specimens were sent to the central laboratory for
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confirmation. In the central laboratory, a rapid dengue
diagnostic system based on serological [envelope and
membrane–specific capture immunoglobulin M (IgM),
IgG enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay] and/or nu-
cleic acid tests (1-step real-time reverse transcription
polymerase chain reaction) [8,11] were used to confirm
a dengue infection.
Statistical analysis
The analyses of the annual, monthly and biweekly in-
fection patterns were based on the number of accumu-
lated cases over each specified time period. The queried
items (independent variables versus dependent vari-
ables) were analyzed by a regression or correlation test.
To evaluate the performance of the airport fever
screening in predicting the total number of imported
cases, we analyzed the relationship between the number
of imported cases detected by airport-screening (X) and
the total number reported by airports, hospitals or
clinics (Y) by a linear regression (P < 0.05 was consid-
ered statistically significant). The quantified relationship
between the lead time of the imported cases (t: month)
with that of the domestic cases was examined as a test
trial We assumed that a unit of lead time (t) ranged
from 0 to several months, and we individually tested
each set of data to estimate the potential relationships.
The association between the fluctuating patterns in the
imported cases (Xt) and the domestic cases (Y) was
measured by the Pearson’s correlation test (R X(t):Y;
R < 0.3 was considered statistically insignificant for the
correlation test) or by a linear regression analysis
(P < 0.05 was considered statistically significant). More-
over, the airport fever screening program was surveyed
using the positive predictive value (PPV), negative pre-
dictive value (NPV), sensitivity and specificity tests;
where PPV=TP/(TP + FP); NPV=TN/(FN+TN); sensi-
tivity =TP/(TP + FN); specificity =TN/(FP +TN); TP:
true positive, the confirmed dengue importations that
were detected in the airports; FP: false positive, the
total of the febrile travelers who had specimens taken
for diagnostics minus the confirmed dengue importa-
tions that were detected in the airports; TN: true nega-
tive, the total of all of the inbound travelers minus the
febrile travelers who had specimens taken for diagnos-
tics minus the confirmed dengue importations that
were detected in the community; and FN: false negative,
the confirmed dengue importations that were detected
in the community. In addition to the 10 NCITs used at
the airports, another 10 NCITs were used for fever
screening in 9 international harbors. The influence of
the entry route, e.g., by boat, was considered when the
PPV and NPV were calculated by adjusting the corre-
sponding numerators and denominators.
Results
Airport sentinel surveillance following fever screening for
dengue infection
By implementing fever screening by NCITs at airports
for the detection of febrile inbound passengers, which
was confirmed by ear temperature readings, we obtained
a fever prevalence that ranged from 0.08-0.10% (Table 1)
among the total inbound passengers. Approximately
29.5-50.9% of the confirmed febrile inbound passengers
coming from dengue-endemic areas, including Southeast
Asia, South Asia, South America and Africa, were
triaged by inspectors and underwent blood sampling for
laboratory confirmation. Overall, 44.9% (95% CI: 35.73-
54.13%) of the confirmed imported dengue cases with
apparent symptoms were detected by the thermal
screening program with a PPV of 2.36% (95% CI: 0.96-
3.75%), an NPV of > 99.99% and a specificity of 99.97%
(95%CI: 99.96-99.97%) (Table 1).
From 2007–2010, a majority of the confirmed dengue-
infected travelers were arriving from dengue-endemic
regions in South or Southeast Asia, such as Indonesia
(21.0-35.1%), Vietnam (20.1-32.0%), Thailand (5.0-13.0%),
the Philippines (9.0-12.3%), Cambodia (4.1-8.0%), Malaysia
(2.0-4.1%), Singapore (1.1-3.4%), India (0–1.1%) and South
America (0–0.7%). Moreover, the cumulative numbers of
the imported dengue cases that were detected at the air-
ports (X) were found to be significantly associated with
the total number of imported dengue cases (Y) using a
linear regression analysis based on a biweekly surveil-
lance from 2007–2011 (Y = 1.68X + 1.98 with a 95%
CI of 1.42-1.95, R2 = 0.61, n = 104, P < 0.0001; Y: bi-
weekly total of the number of imported cases of den-
gue; X: biweekly number of the imported dengue
cases that were screened at the airports) (Figure 1A). In
an analysis of the respective year surveillance data, the
biweekly association (n = 26) was demonstrated by an
R2 value that ranged from 0.35 in 2007 to 0.72 in 2010
(Y = 1.21X + 3.53 with a 95% CI of 1.92-0.51, R2 = 0.35,
P = 0.002 in 2007; Y = 1.60X + 2.49 with a 95% CI of
2.24-0.95, R2 = 0.52, P <0.0001 in 2008; Y = 1.21X + 2.38
with a 95% CI of 0.93-1.50, R2 = 0.75, P < 0.0001 in
2009; Y = 2.08X + 1.33 with a 95% CI of 1.54-2.62,
R2 = 0.72, P <0.0001 in 2010).
The non-endemic characteristics of dengue
The non-endemic status of dengue in Taiwan can be con-
firmed by examining the epidemiological patterns from
2007–2010. First, the outbreak of domestic dengue cases
was temporally aggregated with a slight increase in June, a
peak from September to November, a and a gradual de-
crease in December; the lowest level was reached from
January to February. Furthermore, there were several
months (February to May) in which no domestic cases
were observed in 2007–2010 (Figure 2A). Second, there
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were irregularities in the annual dominant dengue
serotypes among the imported and domestic cases
(Figure 2C), and diversity in the outbreak magnitude and
location were observed (Table 2). Third, the monthly fluc-
tuation patterns in the number of cumulative imported
dengue cases (X) with a 1–3 month lead time (t: month)
were associated with those of the domestic dengue cases
(Y), based on a consecutive 4-year surveillance according
to the Pearson’s rank test (n= 48, RX(t-0):Y = 0.24, RX(t-1):
Y = 0.47, RX(t-2):Y = 0.56, RX(t-3):Y = 0.45 and RX(t-4):Y = 0.22)
(Figure 2A). In addition, according to a regression test
with a lead time of 1–3 months, the monthly cumulative
number of imported dengue cases (X) had a pattern in
parallel with the domestic dengue cases (Y), based on a
consecutive 4-year surveillance (n= 48; R2X(t-0):Y = 0.04,
P=0.097; R2X(t-1):Y = 0.22, P=0.0008; R
2
X(t-2):Y = 0.31,




The impact of the imported dengue cases on domestic
epidemics in dengue-competent hotspots
We analyzed a total of 5,823 dengue cases in Taiwan
from 2007–2010, with 15.7% of those being imported
cases (Table 2). The domestic dengue outbreaks were
A B
Figure 1 Epidemiological trends of the dengue importation into Taiwan. (A) The scatter plots show the relationship between the number
of imported dengue cases, according to the viremic status as measured by a biweekly surveillance of the airport screening program, and the
number of total dengue importations into Taiwan from 2007–2010. The straight line represents a line fitted by the means of a least squares
regression. The coefficient of determination, R2, was estimated to be 0.61 (n = 104, P< 0.0001). The 95% confidence interval of the slope is
1.42-1.94. (B) The scatter plots show the relationship, as measured by a biweekly surveillance, between the number of dengue importations
detected in the airport screening program and the number of dengue importations detected in the community from 2007–2010. The straight
line represents a fitted line by the means of a least squares regression. The coefficient of determination, R2, was estimated to be 0.22 (n = 104,
P< 0.0001). The 95% confidence interval of the slope is 0.44-0.96.
Table 1 The airport screening program mediated by noncontact infrared thermometers (NCITs) followed by laboratory
confirmation, 2007–2010: sensitivity, specificity and predictive values
Year 2007 2008 2009 2010
Total inbound passengers (sample size, n) 12,508,621 12,202,392 12,499,365 14,837,391
Inbound passengers from Southeast Asia 1,164,291 471,938 1,486,357 2,729,618
Confirmed febrile passengers1 11,118 12,158 12,286 12,553
Fever prevalence among total passengers % 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.08
Specimens taken for diagnostics2 5,654 4,946 3,706 3,956
Dengue importations detected in the airport fever screening program 3 72 100 108 126
Dengue importations detected in harbor screenings4 0 1 2 3
Dengue importations reported from communities 107 125 95 175
Sensitivity of the airport fever screening program % 40.22 44.44 53.20 41.86
Specificity of the airport fever screening program % 99.96 99.96 99.97 99.97
PPV5 of the airport fever screening program % 1.28 2.03 2.90 3.22
NPV6 of the airport fever screening program % >99.99 >99.99 >99.99 >99.99
1. Confirmed febrile passengers were detected by NCITs (37.5°C) followed by ear thermometers (more than 38°C) in 2 airports.
2. Confirmed febrile inbound passengers from dengue-endemic countries, mainly Southeast Asia and South Asia.
3. The cumulative results of the International Taoyuan Airport and the International Kaohsiung Airport.
4. Dengue importations reported from fever screening in 9 harbors with 10 NCITs were not enrolled as true positives in calculating the PPV and NPV of airport
fever screening.
5. PPV: positive predictive value of the airport fever screening program.
6. NPV: negative predictive value of the airport fever screening program.
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clustered mainly in the metropolitan areas of Tainan and
Kaohsiung. These areas were the most compatible for
dengue endemics because of their tropical climate and
the presence of A. aegypti, and they accounted for 99.4%
of the domestic cases reported in southern Taiwan from
2007–2010 (Table 2). We detected a geographical het-
erogeneity of dengue outbreaks within Taiwan. In south-
ern Taiwan, there was a positive association between the
annual accumulated numbers of imported and domestic
cases from 2007–2010, i.e., the annual cumulative num-
ber of domestic dengue cases = 45.5 times the annual
cumulative number of imported dengue cases minus
4.58 (n = 20, R2 = 0.53, P < 0.05) (Table 2). These num-
bers were based on the annual surveillance of five local
dengue hotspots (Kaohsiung City/County, Tainan City/
County and Pintung County). In contrast, only sporadic
domestic dengue cases were observed in the urbanized
areas of northern Taiwan, where A. albopictus is the only
established mosquito species and a subtropical climate is
present. In the metropolitan areas of northern Taiwan,
the relationship between the annual numbers of imported
(X) and domestic (Y) dengue cases was low, with less
A B
C 
Figure 2 Trends of the dengue epidemics and the relationships among the cases in Taiwan from 2007–2010. (A) A comparison of the
fluctuations of the monthly number of imported (Xt) vs. domestic cases (Y). (B) The diversity in the annual dominant dengue serotypes among
the domestic and imported cases. (C) The scatter plots show the relationship of the number of imported dengue cases (Xt-0), (Xt-1), (Xt-2) or
(Xt-3) vs. the number of domestic dengue cases, as detected by a monthly surveillance (Y). The respective straight lines represent the lines fitted
by the means of the least squares regressions. The coefficients of determination, R2, were estimated to be 0.059, 0.21, 0.31, or 0.21 (n = 48) with
respective 95% confidence intervals for the slopes being −0.57-6.67, 2.68-9.19, 3.81-9.93, or 2.46-8.98. (C) The diversity in the annual dominant
dengue serotypes among the domestic and imported cases.
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statistical significance (e.g., n = 8, Y= 0.32 X - 6.27,
R2 = 0.39, P= 0.099, in the Taipei area). However, from
2007–2010, the percentage of the annual cumulative
number of dengue cases that were importations was
37.99% in North Taiwan (Taipei, Yilan and Keelung),
higher than 24.21% in southern Taiwan (Chiayi, Tainan,
Kaohsiung and Pintung) (Table 2).
The annual cumulative numbers of dengue importa-
tions reported from clinics (passive surveillance) or
detected at the airports (active surveillance) were asso-
ciated with the numbers of domestic cases in 2007–2010
among the five hotspots (Table 2) in southern Taiwan.
An analysis of the dataset according to the geographical
areas (25 counties/cities) indicated that there were
significant correlations between the annual cumulative
number of dengue importations identified at the airports
(X) and the number of dengue importations reported
from community clinics (Y) (n = 96, Y = 0.93X + 1.208,
R2 = 0.57, P < 0.0001) (Table 2).
Discussion
The role of airport screening in dengue sentinel
surveillance and entry quarantine
By implementing the airport fever screening program
followed by laboratory confirmation, nearly half of the
imported symptomatic dengue cases were detected at
entry, i.e., 40.2% (72/179) in 2007, 44.3% (100/226) in
2008, 52.9% (108/204) in 2009 and 41.5% (126/304) in
Table 2 Geographical distribution of the number of imported dengue cases identified by active and passive
surveillance and the number of domestic dengue cases in Taiwan, 2007–2010
Imported dengue cases Domestic dengue cases
Active surveillance1 Passive surveillance2
Dengue positive Dengue positive
3 Region City/ County 2007 2008 2009 2010 2007 2008 2009 2010 2007 2008 2009 2010
Northern Taipei City 12 18 17 22 17 28 13 36 0 20 0 2
Northern Taipei County 14 22 12 23 13 27 4 36 0 12 1 15
Northern Yilan County 1 1 0 2 1 0 18 1 0 0 0 0
Northern Keelung City 1 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 0 1 0 0
Northern Kinmen County 0 0 1 0 0 0 11 1 0 0 0 0
Northern Lienchiang County 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0
Northern Taoyuan County 7 18 23 23 5 11 4 15 0 2 1 1
Northern Hsinchu County 2 4 3 3 0 5 6 5 0 0 0 1
Northern Hsinchu City 1 2 2 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0
Northern Miaoli County 2 1 1 4 1 3 7 3 0 0 0 0
Central Taichung County 5 6 6 16 10 12 2 19 0 1 0 0
Central Taichung City 0 1 7 5 3 8 2 0 0 0
Central Nantou County 2 1 3 3 2 2 0 2 0 0 10 0
Central Changhua County 2 3 6 6 2 3 0 3 0 0 0 0
Central Yunlin County 0 3 2 1 3 1 1 4 2 0 0 0
Southern Chiayi County 1 0 2 4 7 0 0 4 0 0 0 1
Southern Chiayi City 0 2 0 1 0 0 1 3 0 0 0 0
Southern Tainan County * 3 5 3 9 9 4 2 9 1459 23 8 380
Southern Tainan City * 10 4 2 11 2 0 345 4 2 107
Southern Kaohsiung County* 4 1 4 8 5 3 2 23 40 98 125 83
Southern Kaohsiung City * 5 3 9 7 12 0 141 326 623 984
Southern Pingtung County* 0 3 4 1 6 6 5 6 1 1 76 10
Southern Penghu County 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Eastern Hualien County 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
Eastern Taitung County 0 0 0 1 0 0 4 0 0 0 1 0
Total 72 101 110 129 107 125 95 175 1,990 488 847 1,584
1. Active surveillance: imported dengue cases detected in border screening.
2. Passive surveillance: imported dengue cases detected in the community.
3. *Dengue hotspot; Merging of the city and county jurisdictions in Taichung, Tainan and Kaohsiung since 2010.
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2010 (Tables 1 and 2). The active detection of dengue
importations in airports offers the opportunity to target
symptomatic dengue cases for early self-quarantine at
the entry border, which could potentially help to prevent
some of the local transmission chains. The routine
measurement of body temperatures using infrared ther-
mal monitors at international airports enables mass-
screening for febrile passengers who can be further
subjected to triage. The passengers who arrive from
areas of dengue outbreak and who are determined to be
infected with the dengue virus are required to perform
health self-management for two weeks, which includes
self-quarantine and limitations on community activities.
These hygienic measures are intended to block transmis-
sion of the virus and prevent the large-scale spread of
infections within the community.
In this study, we find that airport dengue screening
also offers an opportunity to create a model for predict-
ing the potential magnitude of all dengue importations
(R2X:Y = 0.61, n = 104, P < 0.0001, 95% CI: 1.42-1.94),
based on a consecutive 4-year biweekly dengue surveil-
lance (Figure 1A). However, the coefficients of determin-
ation of the biweekly dengue surveillance (R2X:Y) varied
among the respective years from 0.35 in 2007 to 0.72 in
2010; this result suggests that a prediction-fulfilment
should be depended on well-controlled daily practices.
Moreover, in terms of the regression relations of dengue
importations detected in the airport vs. those detected in
the community, the R2 = 0.57 was higher in the yearly
surveillance (based on data derived from Table 2) than
that of the biweekly surveillance with an overlapping
95% CI for the slopes (Figure 2C), indicating that a con-
founding of the putative reporting timing might have
occurred.
Moreover, the peak time period of the domestic out-
breaks, with 0 to several months (t) of lag following den-
gue importation, might signal an alert for the domestic
outbreaks in Taiwan; however, there are some other fac-
tors that should be taken into consideration. First, the
R2X(t-n):Y values of the regression analysis were low based
on a consecutive 4-year surveillance (n = 48; R2X(t-n):
Y = 0.059-0.31) and the respective slopes varied greatly, i.
e., changes in the rate of Y (domestic cases) were
dependent on changes in X (dengue importations) with
a 95% CI that ranged from −0.57 to 9.93 (Figure 2C).
Second, the incubation time of dengue is approximately
two weeks [17]; however, variations in the lag of the
peak timing in local dengue epidemics in this study may
have been influenced by multiple factors, including the
seasonal and ecological activity of the Aedes vectors.
The above findings imply that rather than the imported
cases triggering the domestic dengue outbreaks, other
factors might play critical roles in affecting the magni-
tude of the epidemics, such as the distribution,
proliferation and activity of mosquitoes which are influ-
enced by ecological factors [9,10]; meteorological factors
[18]; hygiene education for mosquito density control;
and human protection from mosquito bites [19]. These
findings highlight the importance for critical measures
in dengue control in regard to preventing mosquito bites
and reducing mosquito activity.
Furthermore, a distinct impact of the dengue importa-
tions on community epidemics was observed due to eco-
logical heterogeneity. In northern Taiwan, the number of
annual imported dengue cases was slightly higher than
in southern Taiwan (Table 2). However, the impact of
the annual dengue importations on domestic dengue
cases was less significant (n = 8, R2 = 0.39, P= 0.09), even
in the metropolitan area of urban Taipei. The presence
of A. albopictus, a minor dengue vector accustomed to
being outdoors, in this area resulted in a limited trans-
mission of the virus. In contrast, in southern Taiwan, a
significant impact was observed in the 5 hotspots
(n = 20, R2 = 0.53, P < 0.05). Therefore, the viremic cases
of asymptomatic, mild, latent or secondary dengue infec-
tion can simultaneously or subsequently become new in-
fectious sources with the potential to induce severe
epidemics in southern Taiwan by A. aegypti, a major
dengue vector accustomed to being indoors.
Limitations of airport screening for local epidemics
Different pathogens have different characteristics, the
infectious peak for SARS cases is observed after the
onset of symptoms, whereas the infection associated
with the influenza virus begins a few hours before the
onset of symptoms [12-15] and the viremia of dengue
begins one day before the onset of febrile symptoms
[1,20]. Thus, entry screening is considered more effect-
ive at blocking the transmission of SARS than other
agents. Moreover, a major and common challenge of
utilizing fever screening at borders to reduce the risk of
introducing various infectious agents into a country is
the bypassing of the temperature threshold by afebrile
patients who import viral particles with latent (not yet
symptomatic), mild and asymptomatic infections
[12-15]. The current screening methods for symptomatic
infections at entry borders through real-time RT-PCR
and/or serum tests for dengue diagnostics are limited by a
poor NCIT threshold. Thus, latent, mild or asymptomatic
dengue cases that bypass the NCITs represent a source of
new dengue outbreaks each year. The improvement of
procedures that are aimed at identifying and isolating
these cases or those that promote the education about
mosquito bite prevention by using repellents are thus es-
sential for dengue prevention in dengue-competent
regions.
Another limitation of this study is the lack of a nega-
tive control to compare the impact of border
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intervention based on self-reported fever, symptoms
inspected or the fever screening program via NCIT on
mitigating community dengue epidemics. Studies have
reported a higher sensitivity of entry screening for influ-
enza using NCITs than self-reporting at points of entry
into the healthcare system [21] and on the potential of
using NCIT for mass influenza screening [22]. Another
study reported that entry screening measures such as
thermal scanners, health declarations or medical checks
could delay the local transmission of the pandemic influ-
enza A for approximately 7–12 days [16]. However, we
previously observed that there was no significant impact
on the magnitude of dengue epidemics in the commu-
nity between conducting entry inspections during pre-
airport (by self-reported questionnaires) and post-airport
fever screening [9]. These findings suggested that while
border measures are established to mitigate the trigger-
ing of a dengue outbreak, integrated measures for redu-
cing the transmission of mild, latent and asymptomatic
viremic carriers of dengue and preventing the spread of
secondary domestic infections should simultaneously be
enforced.
The other potential limitations of this retrospective
study are listed below. First, other than the airport entry
routes (the International Taoyuan Airport and the Inter-
national Kaohsiung Airport), approximately 0–0.9% of the
dengue importations detected at the borders (i.e., 0, 1, 2
and 3 cases) were introduced by boats via the 9 ports
screened by NCITs from 2007–2010 (Table 1). However,
we had excluded these boat-mediated dengue importa-
tions in the calculations of the PPV for the airport fever
screening. Second, other than the standard detection of
cases by the NCIT setting at temperature 37.5°C, the few
cases that might have been screened under a conditional
alarm temperature at 36.6°C or with alternative screening
methods, such as symptom-inspecting or self-reporting,
were not completely excluded in our calculation and
might cause a bias. Nevertheless, this influence was rela-
tively small. Third, the significant associations between
the annual and monthly fluctuations of the dengue impor-
tations and the domestic cases by the regression test sug-
gest that utilizing the cumulative data (i.e., mix of all of
the serotypes) might be misinterpreted at an individual
level.
The implications for airport screening as an epidemic
control policy and the importance of reinforcing public
hygiene education
After July of 2003, the world was declared free of SARS;
however, fever screening trials in airports were expanded
in Taiwan and later implemented as part of an active
surveillance program for multiple infectious pathogens,
such as dengue, chikungunya, malaria, influenza and en-
teric bacteria [11]. In addition to the detection of dengue
fever, which is one of the most frequently imported re-
portable diseases every year in Taiwan, this active sur-
veillance policy provided other sentinel functions. For
example, there were 13 imported chikungunya infections
[23] detected among febrile travelers by this active sur-
veillance from 2006–2009; therefore, these systems con-
ferred an increasing awareness of the threat of imported
pathogens.
Our evaluation of the routine border screening for
dengue using NCITs yielded a low PPV, which suggested
a low cost-effectiveness and raised questions about the
effectiveness of the available screening measures to de-
tect a well-known disease at international borders. Des-
pite the presence of devices with improved performance
and affordable implementation costs, there is still a pos-
sibility for infected travelers to not be detected by
screening and subsequently trigger an outbreak, which
would cause a loss of public confidence in the pandemic
response [12-15]. Rather than investing in active screen-
ing by NCITs, which requires a large number of speci-
mens to be collected to detect rare infectious cases at
airports [14], several studies have suggested that focus-
ing more on public hygiene education and the preven-
tion of mosquito bites would be beneficial. In terms of
reducing costs, we suggest that alternative supporting
measures should be taken, such as developing tools for
rapid diagnostics with better sensitivity to replace the
commercial kits. Another step should be replacing
NCITs with self-reporting measures to reduce the num-
ber of specimens taken during the non-endemic periods
and non-epidemic seasons while vector activity is low.
The proportion of dengue cases that are symptomatic
ranges from 10-50%, meaning that approximately 50-90%
of all dengue infections are asymptomatic, only a fraction
of which are reported [3,24]. The frequency of measures
taken by tourists to protect against mosquito bites is less
than 45% [23]. Among travelers, approximately 25-57% of
the dengue importations are accompanied with symptoms
[25]; therefore, 43-75% of the truly asymptomatic or mild
symptomatic dengue cases may become sources for add-
itional dengue infections. In this study, approximately 45%
of the symptomatic dengue importations could be
detected by airport quarantine; however, the other symp-
tomatic dengue importations were latent (not yet symp-
tomatic infections) and were only discovered after the
symptoms appeared or the patients sought medical atten-
tion. Many of the symptomatic dengue importations were
not reported [3]. Dengue viremia begins 1 day before the
onset of symptoms and lasts for 7–12 days after the onset
of symptoms [1,17,20,26]. In Taiwan, the outbreak pat-
terns of confirmed domestic dengue cases are usually tem-
porally aggregated and correlated with the seasonal
changes in the populations of A. aegypti. Because dengue
is transmitted through bites from infected female Aedes
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mosquitoes, especially the primarily indoor vector A.
aegypti that needs blood to mature their eggs, a commu-
nity outbreak may occur. Therefore, we suggest the fol-
lowing interventions: 1) travelers to Southeast Asia, South
America, and Africa should perform vector control beha-
viors to prevent vector borne diseases; 2) tourists should
take steps to control vector spread for at least two weeks
after returning from epidemic areas to stop the spread of
the virus to their neighbors and family because they may
be asymptomatic carriers; and 3) citizens living in areas of
southern Taiwan where A. aegypti mosquitoes exist, such
as Tainan and Kaohsiung, should perform vector control
interventions to reduce virus transmission and prevent
people who have been infected by a certain serotype of
dengue virus from being reinfected by a different serotype
and progressing to dengue hemorrhagic fever. These pre-
cautions should be taken especially during the daytime
and evening hours when the activity of Aedes mosquitoes
peaks [19].
Conclusions
A moderate sensitivity of 44.93% and a PPV that ranged
from 1.28-3.22% were obtained for airport fever screen-
ing in this study. Our findings indicated some limitations
of the airport fever screening programs for preventing
the introduction of dengue. However, these procedures
might help to target some symptomatic dengue importa-
tions for an immediate self-quarantine that might miti-
gate some local dengue transmissions. In addition, a
border intervention could provide an active sentinel sur-
veillance to provide an alert for the potential magnitude
of the dengue importations. As a secondary function to
the alerting role, airport screening might ideally delay
the viral transmission time and mitigate the domestic
spread of dengue before the cold climatic effect can
abolish the activity of the Aedes mosquito. However, the
disproportionate annual cumulative number of imported
vs. domestic dengue infections in dengue hotspots sug-
gests that the viremic carriers of asymptomatic and sec-
ondary infections could become new threatening sources
for the induction of severe epidemics the summer through
the autumn seasons (the epidemic seasons) by the principal
vector A. aegypti. Therefore, to curb potential dengue
transmission, we strongly recommend reinforcing mos-
quito bite prevention among travelers or residents who are
returning from dengue-endemic areas, or those who are
living in dengue-competent or dengue-endemic hotspots.
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